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Substantive Due Process Analysis of 
Nonlegislative State Action: A Case Studyt 
On the evening of October 24, 1976, Barbara McDowell, her 
brother Ramon White, and their cousin Cheri Ballanger, all mi- 
nors, were passengers in an automobile driven by their uncle 
Charles DeGeorge. DeGeorge was stopped on the Chicago Sky- 
way by two Chicago police officers, charged with drag racing, 
and placed under custodial arrest. Since none of the children 
were of age to drive, DeGeorge asked the officers to take them at  
least as far as a telephone booth so that they could contact their 
parents. The policemen refused the request, however, and the 
children were left in DeGeorge's automobile at the side of the 
freeway. After some time, the three decided to leave the car, and 
were forced to cross eight lanes of traffic and walk along the 
freeway to find a telephone. They contacted Barbara's and Ra- 
mon's mother who, unsuccessful in her attempts to enlist assis- 
tance from the police department, eventually sent a neighbor to 
find them. All three children were ultimately retrieved, but the 
cold weather had adversely affected five-year-old Ramon, an 
asthmatic, and he was hospitalized for a week following the 
incident. 
The lawfulness of DeGeorge's arrest was not contested, but 
Eugene and Shirley White, parents of Barbara and Ramon, 
brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983l in United States 
District Court against the two arresting police officers and the 
superintendent of police. They claimed that deprivation of their 
children's constitutional rights had ultimately led to the chil- 
dren's physical and emotional injury. 
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a constitutional claim upon 
7 White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
1. Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep- 
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action at law, suit in eq- 
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
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which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Sev- 
enth Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the superintendent of 
police, but reversed and remanded to the trial court the claim 
against the arresting officers.Vn so ruling, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the officers' alleged actions amounted to a deprivation 
of constitutional rights actionable under section 1983-specifi- 
cally, that the children's rights under the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment had been breached by the police- 
men's refusal to lend them aid? 
The fourteenth amendment specifically prohibits a state 
from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law."' While it has been observed that the basic 
function of due process is to protect individual interests from 
arbitrary governmental action,' what actually constitutes a pro- 
tectible interest under the rubric of "life, liberty, or property," 
and what satisfies the state's obligation to observe "due process 
of law" when deprivation of any such interest is in issue, have 
proved elusive. Actual definitions of due process and of the in- 
terest it protects vary with specific factual  context^.^ It is never- 
theless clear that, depending on the nature of the challenge, the 
guarantee of due process of law may be examined from two dif- 
ferent-though not in all respects distinct-perspectives: proce- 
dural or substantive. 
A. Historical Overview 
Literally, the term "due process of law" denotes the proce- 
2. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1979). 
3. Id. at  383. 
4. US. CONST. amend. XIV, 8 1 (the "due process clause"). 
5. WOE v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
6. Hanna v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). 
The Court has said, "[Tlhere is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent and 
application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual pro- 
cess of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require 
. . . . " Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877). See also Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (state action that "shocks the conscience" violates due process); 
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (state ac- 
tion that transgresses "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of 
justice of English-speaking peoples" is violative of due process guarantees). 
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dure that governmental entities or representatives must follow 
in dealing with the individual. The drafters of the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment intended simply that it provide 
assurance that government could act to deprive an individual of 
life, liberty, or property only by following proper procedure? For 
nearly a hundred years, however, judicial interpretation of the 
phrase has not been limited to this literal meaning. 
In Mugler v. K a n ~ a s , ~  an 1887 case challenging a state pro- 
hibition of alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court first indi- 
cated its willingness to use an expanded due process test to scru- 
tinize the substance of state statutory restrictions, even if 
appropriate legislative procedures had been followed in their en- 
actment? Although the particular statute at issue in Mugler was 
upheld, the Court's opinion firmed the philosophical foundation 
of substantive due process.1° Justice Harlan's majority opinion 
stated that a statute must have a real and substantial relation to 
the promotion, protection, or preservation of the public health, 
safety, or morals to be a legitimate exertion of a state's police 
powers and thereby to satisfy due process requirements." This 
method of focusing on the content of state regulation was first 
used to strike down a state statute in Allgeyer u. Louisiana.12 
The Allegeyer Court refined the test suggested in Mugler, how- 
7. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783 
(1833). See also Graham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 
1830-1860, 40 CAL. L. REV. 483, 485-87 (1952). 
8. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
9. Use of the due process argument to attack the substance of state regulations was 
earlier employed by Justice Bradley, dissenting in the famous Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122 (1873), and concurring in Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City 
Co., 111 U.S. 746,765 (1884). In neither case, however, did a majority of the Court adopt 
Justice Bradley's point of view. 
10. This substantive approach was born of a concern that if the sole issue reviewable 
by the judiciary was whether state governments followed proper procedures, any law en- 
acted according to the required process would be valid. Consequently, any proceeding 
under that law, however arbitrary, would accord with "due process of law." See Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
11. 123 U.S. at 661. Justice Harlan's opinion was joined by six other members of the 
Court. Justice Field filed a separate opinion. 
12. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The Court there overturned a Louisiana statute that pro- 
hibited any conduct within the state aimed at insuring property with any insurance com- 
pany not properly licensed to do business in the state. 
The constitutional challenge to this limitation on contracting powers was not a pro- 
cedural one; rather the contention was that a right to contract existed which, though not 
specifically mentioned in the fourteenth amendment, was sufliciently tied to the concepts 
of liberty and property so as to make the state limitations involved in that case of them- 
selves a deprivation without due process. Id. at 591. 
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ever, and it became apparent that the new due process standard 
required more of a state than a simple showing of a reasonable 
basis for its legislative actions. The Court instead required con- 
vincing evidence that the substantive theories underlying the re- 
strictions were valid, i.e., that the statute would actually achieve 
the ends sought in its enactment. In Lochner v. New York,lS a 
landmark case arising from a due process challenge against a 
New York statute prohibiting employment of bakery workers for 
more than sixty hours a week, the Court rejected in only a few 
words the argument that the law was a valid labor regulation: 
"There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty 
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours 
of labor, in the occupation of a baker. . . . [W]e think that [the 
law in question] involves neither the safety, the morals nor the 
welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in 
the slightest degree affected by the act."14 The Court also re- 
jected the argument that the statute related to public health in- 
terests, responding that it was looking for something more than 
"mere rationality": 
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a re- 
mote degree to the public health does not necessarily render 
the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, 
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate 
and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which in- 
terferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his 
person and in his power to contract in relation to his own 
labor.16 
The Court further explained: "There is, in our judgment, no rea- 
sonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropri- 
ate as a health law . . . . ,916 
The substantive due process analysis employed by the 
Court in Lochner did more than allow the Court to adopt the 
posture of a "super legislature," concerned with the wisdom, and 
not merely the constitutionality, of particular legislative means 
and ends.17 It also expanded the scope of interests considered to 
13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
14. Id. at 57. 
15. Id. at 57-58 (emphasis added). 
16. Id. at 58. 
17. It has been observed that later judicial reference to the seminal Allgeyer case 
was normally with respect to its "significance in opening the door to substitution of the 
Justices' notions of public policy and fundamental values for legislative choices." G. 
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be protected by the due process guarantee. For example, due 
process "liberty," a concept earlier limited to freedom of move- 
ment or absence of physical restraint,18 took on a much broader 
meaning under substantive due process and grew to encompass a 
broad panoply of "liberties" nowhere explicitly described in the 
Constitution.le Perhaps the best description of this expanded 
concept is the Court's own statement in Meyer u. N e b r a ~ k a , ~ ~  a 
case involving a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching 
of foreign languages to any child below the eighth grade: 
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness 
the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment], 
the term has received much consideration and some of the in- 
cluded things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com- 
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac- 
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen- 
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.%' 
Ruling that the "calling of modern language teachers, . . . the 
opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and . . . the power 
of parents to control the education of their owdn2 were all 
within the area of protected liberty, the Court concluded that 
"[nlo emergency ha[d] arisen which render[ed] knowledge by a 
child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as 
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 557 (9th ed. 1975). For exam- 
ples of the Allgeyer-Lochner line of cases, see Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 
525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 
(1908). 
18. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130; see Shattuck, The True Meaning of the 
Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Pro- 
tect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1890). The Supreme Court 
expressly rejected the limits of this traditional view in Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589. 
19. The history of this expansion is recounted in Warren, The New "Liberty" 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926). 
20. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer is historically significant since it is one of two cases 
from the Lochner era in which the Court invalidated state regulations based on 
noneconomic personal liberties. The other case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), struck down an Oregon law requiring that all children, ages eight through sixteen, 
attend public rather than parochial schools. The Court determined that the state's intru- 
sion into recognized areas of personal liberty was without a reasonable basis. Id. at 534- 
35. 
21. 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). 
22. Id. at 401. 
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to justify its inhibition with a consequent infringement of rights 
long freely enj~yed.'~' The Court accordingly held the statute 
unconstitutional as being "arbitrary and without reasonable re- 
lation to any end within the competency of the State.''24 
Although the Court's use of this substantive due process ap- 
proach had significant impact on state legislation during the first 
part of this ~entury,'~ its vitality did not endure. In the mid- 
1930's the Court began to abandon its strict scrutiny of eco- 
nomic and social legislation? and this trend continued until 
1941 when the Lochner-type approach was expressly repu- 
dated.27 Nonetheless, repudiation of Lochner did not effect a 
complete burial of the basic concept of substantive due process. 
B. A "New" Substantive Approach 
The post-1930 withdrawal from strict judicial review of eco- 
nomic regulation was not paralleled by a similar trend in the 
area of certain noneconomic personal interests." In fact, the now 
23. Id. at  403. 
24. Id. For a contrasting case of this era, in which the Court found the deprivation 
of recognizable liberty interests justifiable, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905). The plaintiff in that case claimed that the state's compulsory vaccination statute 
unconstitutionally deprived him of "the inherent right of every freeman to care for his 
own body and health in such a way as to him seems best." Id. at  26. The Court answered 
by holding that liberties secured by the Constitution are not entirely immune from re- 
straint and that the dangers of widespread smallpox justified the statute. Id. at  31. 
25. Nearly two hundred statutes thought by state legislatures to be wise and neces- 
sary fell to the Supreme Court's "judicial veto" during the thirty-year Lochner era. See 
post-1905 cases cited by Justice Frankfurter at  F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
AND THE SUPREME COURT app. I (1st ed. 1938). 
26. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502 (1934). The shift marked by these cases and others was actually a shift of the 
burden of persuasion, rather than of the focus of examination. Analysis remained cen- 
tered on the balance between state interests and the resulting limitations on individual 
interests, but the Court increasingly deferred to the state's own ability to effect this 
balance. "With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of 
the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to 
deal." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. at 537. 
27. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (notions of public policy should not be 
read into the Constitution in such a manner as to give rise to constitutional restraints on 
state legislative action). 
28. Meyer and Pierce were never overruled. But see note 41 infra. Using the sub- 
stantive approach, the court had actually begun incorporation of specific Constitutional 
rights into the fourteenth amendment at  the height of the Lochner era. See, e.g., Gitlow 
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)' in which the Court first assumed that freedoms of 
speech and press under the first amendment were "among the fundamental personal 
rights and 'liberties' " protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id. 
at 666. 
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famous footnote 4 in United States u. Carolene Products2@ sug- 
gested a double standard of judicial review, under which the Su- 
preme Court would assume a deferential stance in areas of com- 
merical regulation, but would maintain an interventionist stance 
in other areas. Justice Stone, the author of the majority opinion, 
based this suggestion on a theory that "[tlhere may be narrower 
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition 
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced 
within the Fo~rteenth."~~ 
This theory has proved to be more than merely a passing 
thought. Indeed, one commentator has observed that it has had 
a "pervasive influence" on the approaches taken by the Court." 
Without referring to a standard of "substantive due process,"s2 
the Court has continued to strictly scrutinize legislation that in- 
fringes on certain aspects of personal liberty. However, impor- 
tant limitations have attached to this new in-depth review that 
distinguish it from the Lochner approach. Whereas the only 
practical bounds to judicial intervention in the Allgeyer-Lochner 
line of cases may ultimately have been the personal predilections 
of the Court at the time,as the Court's "new" substantive ap- 
proach has become an approach with self-limiting parameters. 
Rather than engaging in strict judicial scrutiny in all instances 
of legislative infringement of any of the panoply of rights that 
were easily interpreted under Lochner as protected liberty inter- 
ests, the Court has reserved the compelling state interest stan- 
dard for protection of individual rights either (1) specifically 
contained in the language of the Constitution itself or (2) other- 
wise deemed by the Court to be "funda~nental."~~ Although the 
29. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
30. Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added). 
31. G. GUNTHER, supra note 17, at  593. 
32. The term "substantive due process" had become synonymous with the Lochner 
approach and attending images of judicial rulings on the wisdom, rather than on the 
mere constitutional propriety, of certain state activities. One Supreme Court Justice had 
in fact critically noted that the Court's substantive approach caused it to act more as a 
"super-legislature" than as a judicial body. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 
534 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
33. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
34. Considerable disagreement has arisen, even among members of the Court, over 
whether fourteenth amendment due process limitations on state action encompass only 
the guarantees specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, or whether they incorporate 
all "fundamental" rights. Justice Black was one in particular who was very much op- 
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reserved power to define "fundamental" essentially grants the 
judiciary the same unlimited freedom of definition it enjoyed 
during the Lochner era, the Court has effectively imposed 
bounds on the word's meaning. In addition to the specific guar- 
antees contained in the first eight amendmentsa5 the Court has 
added as "fundamental" only a limited number of rights which, 
though not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, have been 
viewed as implied by its protections and therefore tied directly 
to it: (1) freedom of ass~ciation:~ (2) a right to vote," (3) a right 
to interstate travel,'8 and (4) a right to privacy and some free- 
dom of choice in marital,gs sexua1:O and family1 matters. 
The threshold examination under the new substantive ap- 
posed to a "fundamental rights" test, because of the unlimited power of definition the 
Court could exercise in the name of "natural law." See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46, 68-93 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
Although the Court has not limited the label "fundamental" to specifics in the Con- 
stitution, the runaway definition feared by Justice Black has never materialized. The 
commonly applied test of the Court was articulated by Justice Cardozo, who maintained 
that even though all guarantees "may have value and importance," only those which are 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and therefore fundamental, should be con- 
sidered a part of due process. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
35. Thus far, the Court has recognized incorporation into the fourteenth amend- 
ment of all the first eight amendments except the second and third, the grand jury in- 
dictment requirement of the fifth, and the excessive baillfines provisions of the eighth. 
For a detailed discussion of this incorporation, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968). 
36. This right has been held to be implied by first amendment guarantees, even 
though there is no specific textual reference. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 
(1958). 
37. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (describing a 
right to vote as including a t  least the right to participate in elections on an equal basis 
with other qualified voters); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (state's durational 
residence requirement subject to strict scrutiny as a serious restriction on the fundamen- 
tal interest in voting and as a burden on the right to travel). 
38. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 
(1900). 
39. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). 
40. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1976) (right to purchase 
contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concept of personal liberty broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy); Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right not to be deprived of reproductive capability). 
41. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). However, it  has been noted that had Meyer and Pierce been 
decided thirty years later, their holdings would not have been based on a right to free- 
dom in family matters, but "would probably have gone by reference to the concepts of 
freedom of expression and conscience . . . derived from explicit guarantees of the First 
Amendment against federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief." Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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proach thus looks at  the type of personal interest allegedly in- 
volved. Only if a "fundamental" interest is affected may the 
Court subjectively inquire into the importance of the state's ob- 
jective and into the necessity of interference with the individual 
right as a means of reaching that end.'% In the absence of a "fun- 
damental" interest, presumptively valid state action will gener- 
ally be upheld if it simply meets the rational basis test." 
C. The Procedural Formula 
The procedural approach to due process claims actually in- 
volves consideration of questions raised by both the substantive 
and procedural elements of the due process guarantee. Not only 
must it be determined whether asserted individual interests rise 
to the level of life, liberty, and property for purposes of the due 
process clause, but if a protected interest is implicated, the court 
must further decide what process is due:' i.e., what kinds of 
procedural protections are necessary to overcome the constitu- 
tional prohibition against deprivation without "due process of 
law." 
1. What interests are protectible? 
Whatever additional definition has attached to due process 
liberty, the term describes at least an absence of physical re- 
straint, and few would disagree that, even though this physical 
freedom is not absolute, the state is obliged to protect it from 
arbitrary intrusion by providing adequate procedural guaran- 
tees. The definition of liberty, however, has long exceeded the 
word's literal meaning, and the line separating interests pro- 
tected by due process from those for which no direct constitu- 
tional shield exists has not been clearly drawn. 
In Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. 
M c E l r ~ y ~ ~  the Supreme Court seemed to suggest a balancing 
approach to the protectible interest question, looking to a "de- 
termination of the precise nature of the government function in- 
42. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
43. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 
(1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
44. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,672 (1977); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972). See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 
(1975). 
45. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). 
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volved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by 
governmental action."46 The Court held in McElroy that the due 
process clause was not violated by the summary denial to a cafe- 
teria employee of entrance to a restricted military installation 
where she had been working. The Court reasoned that the gov- 
ernmental function of managing the internal operation and se- 
curity of an important military installation4' outweighed the in- 
dividual's personal interest in working at one isolated and 
specific pla~e,'~ and on that basis concluded that there were no 
due process requirements of notice and hearing on the specific 
grounds for the exclu~ion.~~ 
This balancing process was used by the trial court in Roth v. 
Board of Regents of State Colleges60 to hold that a nontenured 
university professor had been denied due process when the uni- 
versity failed to notify him of its reasons for not renewing his 
original one-year contract. The court reasoned from the McEl- 
roy formula that violation of the due process guarantee had oc- 
curred simply because the plaintiffs interest in reemployment at 
the university outweighed the university's interest in summarily 
dismissing him? Roth was granted a partial summary judg- 
ment, and the Seventh Circuit 
The Supreme Court reversed R ~ t h , ' ~  however, and clarified 
the balancing test? It admitted that Roth's "re-employment 
prospects were of major concern to him-concern which we 
surely cannot say was in~ignificant,"~~ and conceded that "a 
weighing process has long been a part of any determination of 
the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedu- 
46. Id. a t  895. 
47. The installation involved was the Naval Gun Factory (later, the Naval Weapons 
Plant) in Washington, D.C. The factory engaged in the design, production, and inspec- 
tion of naval ordinance, including the development of highly classified systems. Id. a t  
887. 
48. Id. 'at 895-96. 
49. Id. a t  894. 
50. 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 
U.S. 564 (1972). The district court stated that it considered itself bound to apply the 
balancing process described in McElroy. Id. at 977. 
51. Id. a t  977-79. 
. 52. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), reu'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
53. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
54. The Supreme Court had reiterated the balancing approach in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970), suggesting that an individual had a right to invoke the due process 
requirements any time his "interest in avoiding [grievous] loss outweigh[ed] the govern- 
mental interest in summary adjudication." Id. at 263. 
55. 408 U.S. at 570. 
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ral due process,"66 but the Court also made clear that "to deter- 
mine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, 
we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest 
at stake."67 
Turning to the nature of the interest that had allegedly 
been deprived in Roth, the Court noted that "while the Court 
has eschewed rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of 
procedural due process, it has at  the same time observed certain 
boundaries. For the words 'liberty' and 'property' in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be given 
some meaning."" Because the threshold requirement of depriva- 
tion of a protectible interest had not been sati~fied,"~ there was 
no need to determine, by balancing or by any other means, 
whether a particular form of process was due. 
In Paul v. Davis," the Supreme Court further narrowed the 
scope of interests requiring due process protection. The issue in 
Paul centered on police circulation among merchants of a list of 
"active shoplifters," which included the petitioner's name and 
photograph. The petitioner claimed that failure to give him no- 
tice and to provide him an opportunity for a hearing before the 
"defamatory" circular was distributed had deprived. him of lib- 
erty and property without due process,dl and he sought damages 
therefor under section 1983. 
Consistent with its approach in Roth, the Court began its 
analysis in Paul by considering the nature of the interest in- 
volved. It ruled that an interest in one's reputation, affected by 
defamation alone, was insufficient to merit due process protec- 
56. Id. (emphasis in original). 
57. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original). 
58. Id. at 572. 
59. Specifically, "[tlhe State, in declining to rehire [the professor], did not make any 
charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his com- 
munity." Id. at 573. Nor did the state impose upon him any "other disability that fore- 
closed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Id. The Court 
concluded that it stretches the concept of due process protectible liberty too far "to sug- 
gest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but 
remains as free as before to seek another." Id. at 575. 
In a companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court 
assured that due process is violated if a public employee is discharged for reasons that 
would violate specific constitutional guarantees, such as freedom of speech. Id. a t  597. 
This principle remains constant. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976). 
60. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
61. Petitioner had been arrested on shoplifting charges that were not dismissed un- 
til after the flyer had been circulated. Id. a t  696. 
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tion, reasoning (1) that the respondent had "pointed to no spe- 
cific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interest he as- 
sert[ed] ha[d] been invaded,"62 and (2) that there is no 
independent fourteenth amendment right to be free of injury 
wherever the State may be characterized as the tort-feasor." 
The Court also answered a separate claim of deprivation of the 
right of privacy by holding that the alleged interests fell within 
none of the areas recognized as " 'fundamental' or 'implicit' in 
the concept of ordered 1ibert~"~-areas specifically limited to 
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and edu~ation."~~ 
The language of the Paul opinion seemed to sharply limit 
the application of the due process guarantee by restricting the 
scope of protectible liberty to   fundamental^."^^ Yet in a subse- 
quent case, Ingraham u. Wright," the Court admitted that the 
actual contours of the "historic liberty interest9'-an interest 
which, it noted, included the right "generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or- 
derly pursuit of happiness by free men9'-have yet to be pre- 
cisely defined.68 
Even if actual attempts to attach some bounds to the mean- 
ing of due process liberty have appeared confusing at times, the 
Court's underlying concern for some reasonable limits to the due 
process guarantee is unmistakable. And in this context it is clear 
that identification of an effect on a recognized and protected in- 
terest or right is necessary as a minimum in every instance 
before a due process requirement arises under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
62. Id. at 700. 
63. Id. a t  701. The Court indicated that to allow such an interpretation would make 
the fourteenth amendment "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever sys- 
tems may already be administered by the State," and that, since recognized "constitu- 
tional shoals" confront any attempt to derive from even congressional civil rights stat- 
utes a body of general tort law, "a fortiori, the procedural guarantees of the Due Process 
Clause cannot be the source of such law." Id. 
64. Id. at 713 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 325 (1937)). 
65. 424 U.S. at 713. 
66. The Court seemed to limit the scope of due process liberty (beyond the founda- 
tional freedom from physical restraint) to specific constitutional guarantees, fundamen- 
tal areas of privacy, and state-conferred status. 
67. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
68. Id. a t  673 (quoting from the broad definition of liberty offered in Meyer u. Ne- 
braska. 262 U.S. at 399). 
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2. What process is due? 
While specific procedural guarantees relating to criminal 
proceedings and attending effects on physical liberty have been 
outlined by the Supreme Court:@ the protections which must at- 
tend other types of governmental action affecting liberty or 
property vary with each fact situation.70 Beneath the variations, 
however, the due process foundation is the same and requires 
that the individual affected by governmental action be given an 
oportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaning- 
ful manner."71 The particular safeguards required by the facts of 
an individual case are determined most commonly by balancing 
three factors: 
[Flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in- 
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function in- 
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi- 
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'= 
Basic procedural fairness to the individual under this and 
similar analysis has in some cases required that government pro- 
vide individuals a fair notice of planned action and an opportu- 
nity for some sort of hearing before infringing personal rights.7s 
Nevertheless, prior hearings have not been required in every in- 
stance. The Court has held that due process is satisfied in some 
cases by hearings provided after the government has acted, or 
by other adequate procedural safeg~ards.~' 
In Ingraham v. Wright,16 for example, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a charge that children subjected to corporal punish- 
ment by school officials were deprived of due process when not 
69. See notes 34, 35 and accompanying text supra. 
70. " ' "[Dlue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.' " Cafeteria Workers v. McEl- 
roy, 367 U.S. at  895 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. at  
162-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); "[Dlue process is flexible and calls for such proce- 
dural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 481 (1972). 
71. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
72. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
73. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
74. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134 (1974). 
75. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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granted prior hearings to establish cause. The Court ruled that 
affected liberty interests were so protected by common law tort 
remedies that additional administrative safeguards, including a 
prior hearing, were not required to satisfy due process.76 Even 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that "the wording of the com- 
mand that there shall be no deprivation 'without' due process of 
law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation rem- 
edy is sometimes constitutionally ~ufficient."~~ 
D. Summary 
The due process approach taken in a particular case de- 
pends primarily on the type of action challenged. The substan- 
tive approach was created for review of legislation or legislative- 
type activity. The Supreme Court has curbed its energies of the 
Lochner era and in general has allowed great deference to the 
judgment of state officers, requiring only that the legislation or 
regulation in issue relate in some reasonable manner to a legiti- 
mate governmental end. However, instances of legislative regula- 
tion or infringement of rights that the Court has labeled "funda- 
mental" still trigger a more searching judicial examination-one 
not of legitimacy alone, but of compelling state interest for the 
action-and commonly are held to violate the Constitution. 
By contrast, the procedural guarantees of due process are 
governed by the general rule that government cannot limit or 
deny certain individual "rights" without making available a fair 
procedure to determine the legality of the action. Initial focus 
under the procedural approach is on the nature, rather than the 
weight, of the individual interest involved. Consistent with its 
substantive approach, however, the Supreme Court has generally 
treated governmental infringement of a fundamental right as a 
per se violation of due process and has not considered the form 
of the procedures followed.78 In cases where the interests in "life, 
liberty, or property" fall short of being "fundamental" but are 
nevertheless proteqted by the due process clause, analysis has 
turned to the additional questions of what process was due 
under the particular circumstances of each case and whether 
76. The Court further stated that even if the need for an advance hearing had been 
clear under the facts of the case, the administrative burden of providing such hearing 
would of itself weigh heavily against requiring it. Id. at 680-81. 
77. Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
78. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 US.  593, 597 (1972). 
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that process or an equivalent one was provided. Only when suffi- 
cient safeguards have not been provided in some form is there 
properly a breach of the due process guarantee and an action- 
able violation of a constitutional right." 
11. White's APPROACH: FAR FROM UNITED 
The complaint in White u. RoehfordsO charged the defen- 
dant police officers with violations of constitutional rights under 
three principal headings: (1) interference with a right to inter- 
state travel; (2) interference with a right to liberty and to family 
integrity; and (3) interference with a right to freedom from in- 
timidation and coer~ion.~' However, since much of the Seventh 
Circuit's attention was focused on classifying the officers' omis- 
sive actions as gross or reckless negligence for purposes of liabil- 
ity under section 1983P only a portion of the short opinion was 
devoted to a discussion of the nature of the due process violation 
involved. 
Aside from an indication in the concurring opinion that pro- 
cedural issues were considered by the court to be irrelevant to 
the circumstances of this case,'" the court did not identify the 
due process framework applied in its analysis. It simply an- 
nounced that the plaintiffs had been denied due process based 
on two grounds: (1) that "chief among [the liberty interests pro- 
tected by the due process clause] is the right to some degree of 
bodily in tegr i t~"~  and that this right was intruded upon by the 
police officers' "unjustified" refusal to lend aid to the children;86 
79. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 682. 
80. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
81. Id. at 389; see Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Appellees' Brief at 3, White v. 
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
82. A continuing difference of opinion exists among the circuits as to the requisite 
level of negligence necessary to bring unintentional acts within the realm of deprivations 
of constitutional rights actionable under 5 1983. The Seventh Circuit's apparent concern 
in the instant case for qualifying the level of negligence descriptive of the policemen's 
actions was because of its earlier adoption of a "reckless disregard" standard in this 
context. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this 
search for a standard of conduct under 5 1983, see Comment, Actionability of Negli- 
gence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U .  PA. L. REV. 533 (1978); 
Note, Section 1983 Liability for Negligence, 58 NEB. L. REV. 271 (1978). 
83. 592 F.2d at 387 n.2 (Tone, J., concurring). Judge Tone indicated that questions 
of procedure were irrelevant because it was not the failure to provide adequate process 
before leaving the children on the highway that was complained of; rather, it was the 
unjustified interference with personal security. 
84. Id. at 383. 
85. Id. 
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and (2) that, even though no physical force was used, the police 
officers' conduct was such as to "shock the conscience" and thus 
alone violated due process.s6 The court also described a possible 
third ground-that a protected interest in the "integrity of the 
parent-child relationship" was harmed by depriving the children 
of adult care-but relegated discussion of that deprivation to a 
footnote.87 
The dissentss asserted that the cases cited by the court "[iln 
no way . . . support appellants' principal claims that they were 
deprived of their constitutional rights to liberty, non-interfer- 
ence with family affairs or freedom to travel in interstate com- 
mer~e."~@ Apart from this criticism, the dissent's major conten- 
tion was that there was no stated cause for liability because 
there was no showing of proximate cause or breach of any af- 
firmative duty by the policemen to render assistance to the 
children?" 
As one Supreme Court Justice has observed, "The decision 
of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which fol- 
low closely on well-accepted principles and criteria."@l Although 
many of the "principles and criteria" that provide contour to the 
due process guarantee are admittedly imprecise, the courts have 
not been left to make decisions without direction. Even so, strik- 
ing inconsistencies exist between the general guidelines offered 
by Supreme Court due process decisions and the Seventh Cir- 
cuit's analysis in White v. Rochford. 
A. The Apparent Rationale of White v. Rochford 
The Seventh Circuit's failure to consider procedural issues 
in White indicates that it based its decision on what it consid- 
ered to be purely substantive protections of the due process 
clause. This presumption is buttressed by the court's unqualified 
acceptance of the only two specific rights described at any 
length in its decision: "Not only does the Due Process Clause 
86. Id. at 385. 
87. Id. at 383 n.1. 
88. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Kilkenny, Senior Circuit Judge for 
the Ninth Circuit, sitting on the court by designation. 
89. 592 F.2d at 390 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 392-93. 
91. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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restrain [I] undue incursions on personal security, but also it re- 
strains [2] state activities which are fundamentally offensive to 
'a sense of justice' or which 'shock the conscience.' "@2 Since the 
court reversed the district court's decision on the grounds that 
at least these two "substantive rights" were affected, the best 
method for examining its reasoning is to independently test 
these identified rights and the Seventh Circuit's substantive 
analysis. 
I .  Rational basis and unjustified incursion 
It is unclear whether the constitutional breach identified by 
the court in White was a deprivation of a protectible liberty in- 
terest coupled with a failure to meet a rational basis require- 
ment, or a violation of an independent and fundamental right to 
be free from all undue intrusions on personal security. Under 
either interpretation, however, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning 
departed from the norm set by Supreme Court decisions. 
The proposition that the court applied at least some form of 
rational basis test in White is supported by the court's con- 
clusory description of the officers' refusal to take the children 
into custody as "arbitrary" or "unju~tified."@~ In an earlier case, 
Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District," the Sev- 
enth Circuit described substantive due process and rational ba- 
sis in similar terms: 
The claim that a person is entitled to "substantive due pro- 
cess" means, as we understand the concept, that state action 
which deprives him of life, liberty, or property must have a ra- 
tional basis-that is to say, the reason for the deprivation may 
not be so inadequate that the judiciary will characterize it as 
"arbitr~ry.'*~ 
Using this concept as an overlay to the White opinion helps ex- 
plain the court's failure to focus specifically on the presence or 
absence of a reasonable connection between the intrusion and a 
legitimate governmental end. The Seventh Circuit in effect ruled 
that there was no rational basis for the police officers' actions in 
this case by labeling those actions "arbitrary;" consequently, the 
92. 592 F.2d at 383 (emphasis added). 
93. Id. The appellants' brief also specifically argued that no reasonable basis existed 
for the appellees' conduct. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9. 
94. 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974). 
95. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). 
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court only had to describe the results in terms of effects on a 
protectible interest in life, liberty, or property to find a violation 
of the due process clause.96 This requirement was in turn met by 
holding that the officers' negligence infringed on a liberty inter- 
est in bodily integrity and physical security." 
Although a form of the rational basis test was adaptable to 
the facts in White, the underlying question remains whether 
that due process test was proper under the circumstances, i.e., 
whether the court was correct in its tacit assumption that any 
deprivation of a protectible liberty interest by means it could 
characterize as "arbitrary" or "unjustified" violated a right to 
substantive due process. 
In its own discussion of the rational basis test, the Supreme 
Court has never expressly limited its application to the examina- 
tion of statutes or other regulatory actions of state instruments. 
It is reasonable to conclude, however, that such a limitation in- 
heres in the very history and nature of the approach itself, that 
it is thus an inappropriate due process test for nonlegislative ac- 
tivity, and therefore improperly applied in this case. 
The rational basis measuring stick was not created by the 
Court to resolve due process challenges to all state actions and 
activities. It was formulated instead to test the validity of legis- 
lative enactments and to check the exercise of the State's law- 
making power, which it was feared normal procedural require- 
ments could not effectively limit.98 Even within this limited 
target area, the rational basis test is of questionable continued 
validity; it seems to have buckled beneath the weight of judicial 
deference to the states' exercise of their own powers. Not only 
did varying standards of "irrationality" and "arbitrariness" 
under the traditional substantive approach generate serious crit- 
icism? but the use today of the rational basis test by the Su- 
96. The Jeffries opinion recognized that a lack of rational basis must always be tied 
to a recognizable right to "life, liberty or property7'-that there is not an independent 
due process right to "freedom from arbitrariness." 492 F.2d at 4 n.8. 
97. It  is ironic that the concept of liberty could be thus interpreted to include both a 
right not to be taken into another's physical custody and the right to be taken into 
physical custody. This dilemma is not resolved by the court's focus on the facts of result- 
ing emotional and physical injury. 
98. The plaintiffs in White did not challenge any sort of statute, rule, or regulation. 
Their complaint was of police negligence in failing to act. 
99. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 
(1976). 
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preme Court is virtually a signal of state victory.loO This does 
not mean that due process protection from legislative action in- 
fringing nonfundamental rights is no longer available; rather, the 
protection is couched in terms of procedural, rather than sub- 
stantive, rights and limitations. 1°1 
These doctrinal and practical bounds to the rational basis 
analysis were seemingly ignored by the Seventh Circuit in 
White. The discretionary actions of police officers, regardless of 
how wisely exercised in specific instances, are among the various 
forms of governmental activity that fall outside the raison d'gtre 
of the substantive approach because they may be effectively con- 
trolled and their abuse deterred by procedural methods.lo2 
The Seventh Circuit's use of a rational basis substantive 
test in this case was thus laid on a false foundation. Alone this 
error might have been harmless, but its impact was compounded 
by the court's analysis. Not only did the approach attach undue 
weight to the personal interests involved, but it failed to account 
for the practical and usually deferential position the Supreme 
Court has taken toward state action under a rational basis due 
process examination. In Kelley v. Johnson,los for example, the 
100. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mis- 
souri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also Ingra- 
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
Through these cases flows a common thread of emphasis that ready invalidation of 
state activities under the due process clause may not be compatible with maintenance of 
state autonomy in our federal system. The Court has noted the following: "We must 
accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day 
adminstration of our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be con- 
strued to require federal judicial review of every such error." Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 
341,349-50 (1976). In a similar vein, the Court in Meachum observed that interpretation 
of the dub process clause should not "involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary 
decisions that are not the business of federal judges." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. a t  228- 
29. See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HAW. L. REV. 489, 502-03 (1977). 
101. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In LaFleur the 
Supreme Court carefully avoided the substantive label in invalidating a school board rule 
under the due process clause. It instead applied a procedural standard and found the 
rule lacking. 
102. This is especially true if sanctions are imposed for breach of those require- 
ments. One such sanction, the exclusionary rule, renders evidence obtained by "unrea- 
sonable searches and seizures" inadmissible a t  trial. On the subject of sanctions, disci- 
pline and police misconduct in general, see Brent, Redress of Alleged Police Misconduct: 
A New Approach to Citizen Complaints and Police Disciplinary Procedures, 11 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 587 (1977). 
103. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). This case involved a challenge to a county police regula- 
tion establishing a mandatory hair grooming policy for the police force. 
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Supreme Court placed the burden upon the party making a sub- 
stantive due process challenge to show the absence of any ra- 
tional connection between the regulation and a legitimate state 
end.lo4 The Seventh Circuit in White effectively ignored any 
such presumption of constitutionality. By independently classi- 
fying the defendant officers' behavior as grossly negligent, the 
court placed upon them the burden of demonstrating any rea- 
sonable justification for their actions.lo5 This effective presump- 
tion of unconstitutionality could not be overcome because the 
defendants' admission of facts in the complaint was required in 
order to make a motion to dismiss.lo6 The outcome thus de- 
parted from the deferential position taken by the Supreme 
Court. In Kelley the Court held that the district court's original 
dismissal following the motion was justified.lo7 In White, by con- 
trast, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court's dismissal 
for failure to state a constitutional claim was in error.lo8 
2. Strict scrutiny and fundamental rights 
Certain aspects of the analysis in White u. Rochford appear 
to be based on a higher standard of review than that normally 
applied in the rational basis context. It will be recalled that 
under either the "modern" substantive approach or a purely 
procedural due process analysis, the deprivation of a right the 
Court has labeled as "fundamental" is usually treated as a per 
se denial of due process.lW This is effected under what has been 
104. Id. at 247. The Court was willing to assume that the right to wear one's own 
hair at a length of one's own choosing might be a protectible aspect of liberty, but held 
that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of showing that no rational basis supported 
regulation of the length of policemen's hair. 
105. The Court placed great weight on its conclusion that there was simply no ap- 
parent justification, 592 F.2d at 3&1; yet it did so without considering possible reasons 
for the policemen's refusal to take the children with them in the patrol car. The court 
also did not openly consider the possible relevance to the policemen's decision of the fact 
that one of the "children" was actually sixteen years old, Appellee's Brief at 6. 
106. 592 F.2d at 382. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of 
facts as true. See Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. City of Indian Rocks Beach, 434 
F.2d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 1970). 
107. 425 U.S. at 249. 
108. 592 F.2d at 382. 
109. A substantive due process analysis of a nonlegislative infringement of even 
fundamental rights is technically open to the same doctrinal criticism as the rational 
basis approach discussed in the text accompanying note 98 supra. Nonetheless, since the 
identification of the nature of an affected interest is part of the procedural approach, and 
since the very definition of fundamental rights precludes any substantial interference by 
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termed "strict judical scrutiny9'-a method of review that places 
upon the state the burden of demonstrating a compelling inter- 
est or necessity to justify any substantial deprivation of a pro- 
tected personal right.l1° The question thus becomes whether a 
fundamental interest was involved under the facts of this case. 
The complaint in White specifically alleged interference 
with a right to travel interstate, which has been labeled "funda- 
mental" by the Supreme Court,ll1 but the Seventh Circuit did 
not address that contention in its opinion.l12 An argument that 
the action interfered with a right to family integrity was also 
raised, but the court mentioned it only in a footnote-an indica- 
tion of an unwillingness to view this particular interest as a fun- 
damental right under the facts.llS However, the court did attach 
some importance in context to a right to physical security. 
a. Fundamental interest in personal security? The Sev- 
-- - - -- -- 
government authority, regardless of procedure, the practical results of a procedural over 
a substantive analysis in this area are often indistinguishable. 
110. Just as "rational basis" generally signals state victory, standards of strict scru- 
tiny and compelling state interest usually mean victory for the individual since the 
courts invariably can suggest a less burdensome alternative to the action taken by the 
state. The concurring opinion in White spoke specifically of necessity: "Unnecessarily 
endangering the innocent parties in reckless disregard of their safety . . . constituted an 
unjustifiable intrusion on their federally protected rights." 592 F.2d at 388 (Tone, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). The concurring opinion also suggested alternatives. Id. a t  
n.3. 
111. See cases cited note 38 supra. 
112. Only the dissent touched on this particular argument: 
The fact that the minors were left unattended and were forced to cross the 
dangerous Skyway does not bootstrap the officers' arrest and detention of 
DeGeorge into a violation of appellants' constitutional right to travel in inter- 
state commerce. . . . If there was interference with appellants' right to travel 
in interstate commerce, that action was supplied by their uncle in failing to 
obey the law. 
F.2d a t  389. 
113. Id. at 383 n.1. Although the court did not refer specifically to a fundamental 
right to family integrity, it did refer to cases cited by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to support the notion of fundamental penumbral rights 
relating to marriage and sexual relationships. From these cases, however, the White 
opinion distilled what it felt was another common strain-"a particular emphasis by the 
Due Process Clause on the integrity of the parent-child relationship." 592 F.2d at 383 
n.1. If by this reference the court wished to suggest that a fundamental right was 
breached by the temporary separation between parent and child that occurred in this 
case, it does not so specify. The court only suggested that "[ilt is difficult to believe that 
this [parent-child] relationship is any less harmed by depriving children of adult care 
and stranding them on a freeway than by controlling school curricula." Id. But see Gris- 
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. a t  482, which suggests that Meyer u. Nebraska and Pierce 
u. Society of Sisters did not survive the post-Lochner demise of substantive due process 
because of a particular concern for family solidarity, but only because of close ties to first 
amendment rights of religion and speech. 
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enth Circuit's inclusion of an interest in personal security or a 
"right to some degree of bodily integrity"l14 within the scope of 
"liberty" protected by the due process guarantee of the four- 
teenth amendment is adequately supported. However, this right, 
like freedom from physical restraint, has not been granted the 
same level of immunity from government incursion as have, for 
example, the specific first amendment rights regarding speech 
and religion.l16 Incursion on personal security alone would there- 
fore not constitute the per se violation of due process seemingly 
identified in White. The Seventh Circuit instead described an 
independent and apparently fundamental right to be free from 
unjustified intrusions on personal security.l16 
Support for such a position can be found under virtually 
identical language in cases cited in the White opinion, but there 
are important differences in underlying rationale. In Jenkins u. 
Averett,l17 for example, the Fourth Circuit recognized a right to 
personal security and found it infringed by reckless conduct re- 
sulting in injury to another. However, that case involved the 
pursuit and arrest of a suspect; the Fourth Circuit tied the sus- 
pect's "right to be free from arbitrary intrusions on personal se- 
curity" to the specific and fundamental fourth amendment 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.l18 By compar- 
ison, no fourth amendment deprivation was alleged by the plain- 
tiffs or suggested by the Seventh Circuit in White."@ 
The White opinion also quoted language from the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Ingraham v. Wright120 suggesting that a right 
to physical security actually exists independent of the fourth 
amendment. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the Ingraham Court 
spoke of an historic liberty in the "right to be free from, and to 
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal se- 
114. 592 F.2d at 383. 
115. The deprivation of physical liberty by arrest, for instance, does not trigger 
strict judicial scrutiny even when warrants, which are normally required are not ob- 
tained. Physical freedom is still protected, of course, but by procedural, not substantive, 
controls. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. a t  679-80 (citing United States v. Watson, 
423 U.S. 411 (1976)). 
116. 592 F.2d at 383 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US. at 673). 
117. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). 
118. Id. a t  1232. This rationale, as was recognized in the concurring opinion in 
White, is one commonly followed in excessive force cases. 592 F.2d a t  387. 
119. The court did not address any fourth amendment considerations, not even in 
terms of labeling the uncle's arrest "unreasonable" because of its effect on the children. 
120. 430 US. 651 (1977). 
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curity."lal This phrase, however, was quoted out of context and 
is therefore misleading. The more complete quotation, acknowl- 
edged by the concurring opinion in White,lP2 reveals that the 
Supreme Court did not refer to such a right in absolute terms 
and did not imply, as the majority opinion in White seemed to 
suggest, that infringement alone would violate a substantive 
guarantee of due process. Ingraham identified this right to be 
free from unjustified intrusions on personal security as a "liberty 
preserved from deprivation without due process."12s It seems 
anomalous to conclude that the same element-freedom from 
unjustified actions-should entitle a person to due process and 
at the same time be a part of the process due. 
b. The Rochin test. While there may be doubt as to the 
position the Seventh Circuit took toward the children's right to 
liberty, the alternate thrust of its opinion was absolute. It identi- 
fied an unqualified right to be free from any "state activities 
which are fundamentally offensive to 'a sense of justice' or which 
'shock the conscience!"'124 If by the use of this language the 
court meant to suggest that Rochin u. Californiala6 established a 
fundamental substantive right, it did so only by an overly broad 
reading of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in that case. 
Rochin was not a substantive due process case at all. Its ra- 
tionale and holding dealt strictly with the procedural guarantees 
of the due process clause; the "shocks the conscience" test, to 
which the Rochin decision gave birth, had nothing whatsoever to 
do with defining an independent and absolute right, as the court 
in White apparently assumed. The liberty interest a t  stake in 
Rochin was liberty in its classical sense. It was an interest in 
freedom from physical restraint, a freedom deprived in that case 
as a result of criminal conviction and incarceration. The Rochin 
opinion was simply addressed to the question of whether the 
conviction was obtained by methods satisfying "due process of 
law." The specific inquiry centered on the methods used to ob- 
121. 592 F.2d at 383 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US. at 673). The opinion 
also noted that nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, that an indi- 
vidual's reputation is not protected by the due process clause, "can be construed as re- 
treating from the position that an individual's right to be free from physical and emo- 
tional well-being is protected by the substantive guarantees of that clause." 592 F.2d at 
386. 
122. Id. at 387 (Tone, J., concurring). 
123. 430 US. at 673. 
124. 592 F.2d at 383 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165, 172-73 (1952)). 
125. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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tain the evidence leading to the defendant's conviction and im- 
pris~nment.~'~ In Justice Frankfurter's own words: "The pro- 
ceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism 
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that 
shocks the conscience."127 
Had Rochin been decided after later Supreme Court rulings 
that applied the limitations of the exclusionary rule to the 
states,"' or after the right of privacy cases,lZ9 it presumably 
could have been based on purely substantive grounds. But it was 
not, and it is inconsistent with its true rationale to draw from its 
language a fundamental substantive right independent from the 
facts of the case. As the Court stated in Rochin: "The vague con- 
tours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We 
may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and 
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function."lsO 
B. What the Court Missed 
It is interesting that the court in White relied upon Ingra- 
ham u. WrightlS1 to demonstrate the existence of a right to per- 
sonal security, but saw no need under the facts before it to fol- 
low Ingraham's procedural analysis. It is this procedural 
approach that is normally followed when an affected right, 
though protectible, is less than fundamental.lS2 Ingraham noted 
that although there is a right to personal security or even a right 
126. This well-known case involved a complaint that a criminal defendant's convic- 
tion was the result of the admission of evidence obtained in violation of due process. The 
contested evidence was two capsules containing morphine that were obtained by state 
narcotics agents who had broken into the defendent's bedroom and had observed him 
take the capsules from a nightstand near his bed and put them into his mouth. When the 
agents could not retrieve the capsules by prying the defendant's month open, they had 
his stomach "pumped" against his will. The Supreme Court termed the admission of the 
evidence the equivalent of a coerced confession obtained by means "too close to the rack 
and screw" to be ignored. Id. at 172. 
127. Id. (emphasis added). 
128. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
129. See, e.g., the "privacy in the marital bedroom" language in Griswold v. Con- 
necticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
130. 342 U.S. at 170. 
131. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
132. The right to education, for example, though a recognized right in a greater defi- 
nition of liberty, is not a fundamental one. Thus, even though a deprivation of the right 
to attend school requires the satisfaction of certain procedural guarantees, Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565 (1975), it does not of itself "substantively" violate the due process clause. 
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against unjustified intrusion upon physical security as a part of 
an individual's right to liberty, identification of this right in a 
particular instance is not of itself sufficient to answer the due 
process question.1ss The Seventh Circuit, however, did not pro- 
ceed in its analysis beyond the point where it determined that 
this right to physical security had been affected. It essentially 
held that this deprivation was alone sufficient to create a cause 
of action under section 1983. 
Because many due process claims are based upon specific 
Bill of Rights guarantees that have been incorporated into the 
fourteenth amendment, the two-tiered procedural analysis fre- 
quently may be unnecessary. But the Supreme Court did find 
the procedural questions necessary in Ingraham. The White 
court's failure to follow 'suit, even though it relied heavily upon 
Ingraham to identify a protectible right, implies that it over- 
looked a portion of the analysis necessary to actually identify a 
breach of the due process clause.lS4 
The determination of what process is due under the circum- 
stances of a particular case is strictly a matter of judicial balanc- 
ing.lS5 There are thus no established rules that would mandate 
an outcome different from that arrived at by the Seventh Cir- 
cuit's particular form of nonprocedural analysis in this case. 
Nevertheless, several important factors were not granted proper 
weight or consideration in White v. Rochford. Principal among 
these was the underlying nature of the circumstances and al- 
leged violations of the case. The court also failed to consider the 
possibilities of extraconstitutional common law or administrative 
remedies for the injuries claimed. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Paul v. Davisls6 contained 
language critical of interpretations and beliefs that "would make 
of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superim- 
posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by 
the states."ls7 It noted that "it would come as a great surprise to 
133. 430 U.S. at 673-74. 
134. It is immaterial that the complaint was not leveled specifically at failure to 
provide adequate notice and hearing prior to leaving the children in the car. If simple 
failure to allege inadequate procedure made procedural questions irrelevant, plaintiffs 
could successfully avoid Ingraham and similar precedents altogether. 
135. The relative weight given to each factor described at text acompanying note 72 
supra, is determined by the court under the facts of each particular case. They are 
neither preweighed nor prebalanced. 
136. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
137. Id. at 701. 
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who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amend- 
to learn that it worked such a result."ls8 The Paul Court 
responded to a tendency toward undue expansion of the due 
process cause of action by placing limits upon the scope of pro- 
tected "liberty." 
Though the ultimate solutions were different from those 
adopted in Paul, the Court's concern for appropriate limits to 
due process action was again evidenced in its later decision in 
Ingraham. There the Court admitted that a protectible liberty 
interest was at stake, but reasoned that the fourteenth amend- 
ment did not proscribe all deprivations or incursions on that in- 
terest-only those deprivations without due process. It thus re- 
jected student claims that the process due had not been afforded 
when corporal punishment was administered without opportu- 
nity for a prior hearing. Because in the Court's view there was 
suflicient force in proceedings available under the state's com- 
mon tort laws to remedy any unjustified punishments and to 
generally deter abuse, no additional safeguards were constitu- 
tionally required. A deprivation had occurred, but it was with, 
not without, due process.lS@ 
Just as Florida common law allowed tort actions against 
teachers for abuse of their authority to discipline children-a 
fact of which Ingraham took special n~ticel~~-Illinois law rele- 
vant to the circumstances in White provides an established basis 
of police liability for abuse of their particular duties."' Both 
138. Id. at  699. See also Baker v. McCollan, 433 U.S. 137 (1979). Baker was decided 
by the Supreme Court after the Seventh Circuit's decision in White, but it reinforces the 
observation that the Supreme Court is concerned with federal court inroads into state 
tort law. The allegation in Baker was that the failure of a sheriPs office to exercise 
reasonable care to ascertain the true identity of an arrested individual, and the detention 
of that individual over his protests for several days before the error was discovered, 
amounted to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 
The Court, however, made it clear that "[s]ection 1983 imposes liability for viola- 
tions of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising 
out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under 
traditional tort-law principles. . . . [Flalse imprisonment does not become a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official." Id. at 126. 
139. The due process clause does not guarantee unqualified enjoyment of life, lib- 
erty, or property. It only prdects against governmental deprivations of those personal 
interests without due process. 
140. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 677. 
141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gallatin Cty., 418 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1969). The court there 
recognized that under Illinois law a policeman can be held liable for negligence that 
proximately causes injury to a third person, even if the negligent act is committed in 
performance of the policeman's duty. See also Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 
Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966); Andrews v. Porter, 70 Ill. App. 2d 202, 217 
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state tort law and applicable criminal provisions142 were refer- 
enced by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion, but only to support 
its position that the policemen were under an affirmative duty to 
aid the children.14' No weight at  all was given to either aspect of 
state law in determining whether there was a lack of necessary 
process. It is difficult to rationalize this incomplete use of the 
Ingraham approach, especially against the backdrop of voiced 
Supreme Court concern for possible encroachment by the fed- 
eral courts, under the guise of the fourteenth amendment, into 
areas traditionally covered by state laws."' 
C. Implications of the White Decision: An Emotional Gloss 
on the Due Process Guarantee 
The court's narrow holding in White v. Rochford is less dis- 
turbing than its supporting rationale, perhaps because the court 
did not articulate ita exact reasons for drawing the conclusions it 
did. The fact that no clear precedent supports the Seventh Cir- 
cuit's uniquely substantive analysis of the type of actions alleged 
in the case, coupled with the court's refusal to even acknowledge 
the Ingraham rationale, raises the question whether the opinion 
was more an emotional reaction than a true due process 
analysis.146 
This tendency toward judicial subjectivity is the very ten- 
dency that engendered the greatest criticisms against the open- 
endedness of the substantive due process analysis during the 
early decades of this century.14@ It has no doubt also been instru- 
mental in more recent Supreme Court efforts to darken an ever- 
fading line between the moral responsibilities commonly gov- 
erned by state statutes, tradition, or common law, and the nar- 
N.E.2d 305 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d 
597 (1967). 
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, 5 2368 (1973) (prohibiting willful abandonment of chil- 
dren to the elements). 
143. 592 F.2d at 384. 
144. See notes 137-139 and accompnying text supra. See also Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
145. "It is difficult to understand how conduct so clearly deserving of universal rep- 
robation can be said to fall outside the protections of the Due Process Clause . . . . " 592 
F.2d at  386. 
146. "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and 
the accident of our finding certain opitlions natural and familiar or novel and even 
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes em- 
bodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States." Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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rower, more basic constitutional rules that establish only mini- 
mum standards of legitimate government conduct. 
White v. Rochford is unique in its approach, even as it is 
unique in its facts.14' Time alone will determine whether the 
vague contours and multiple facets of the court's reasoning will 
help or hinder the decision's precedential value. While interest- 
ing theories may be distilled from it, it will probably only serve 
as an example of how difficult it is for the judiciary to rid itself 
of the biases of tort philosophy and to be objective when faced 
with a purely constitutional challenge, even though the facts 
may arouse moral sensitivities. 
IV. CONCLUSION: A CONSTITUTIONAL MISSTEP 
In White v. Rochford, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that 
the offending policemen had deprived the plaintiff children of 
constitutional rights seem to follow emotional impulses more 
closely than it follows acceptable principles of due process anal- 
ysis. The court gave only incomplete reference to appropriate 
case law, it refused to consider even the relevance of procedural 
questions, and it failed to note the special relevance that the re- 
cent Supreme Court decision in Ingraham v. Wright gave to the 
availability of independent causes of action under Illinois law. In 
so doing, the court successfully, even if perhaps not purpose- 
fully, avoided the balancing that has been commonly used to re- 
solve due process conflicts between nonlegislative state action 
and constitutionally protected, but less than fundamental, per- 
sonal interests. 
The White decision's uniquely substantive approach to the 
due process issue evidences only an attempt to arrive at a "just" 
result based on the appellate court's independent evaluation of 
the officers' alleged actions. The final judicial product is one that 
is blatantly inconsistent with evident Supreme Court policy that 
the due process clause is not a valid source of general federal 
tort liability. If the Seventh Circuit had good reasons to circum- 
vent this policy, it could have masked its efforts more effec- 
tively. The holding in White could have been at least more 
clearly reasoned, even if not more solidly based, had it been de- 
cided on grounds of procedural insufficiency in the police of- 
ficers' actions. 
147. The dissent noted that the court "citkd to no Civil Rights Act authority, and [it 
found] none, which [was] even closely akin factually" to this case. 592 F.2d at 389. 
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Substantive due process analysis has not disappeared from 
judicial decision making, but the trend, which should continue, 
has been to carefully limit its scope. Courts that are inclined to 
adopt a purely substantive approach toward nonregulatory types 
of state action similar to that challenged in White should first 
insure that the rights involved are within the scope of "funda- 
mentals" that find solid root in specific constitutional language 
or values. The Seventh Circuit's failure to do so in White u. 
Rochford resulted in an obviously superficial analysis, wanting 
for necessary procedural considerations and balance. 
David W.  Slaughter 
